quinta-feira, 30 de agosto de 2012

O primeiro mercantilista...

Se no último texto que colocamos aqui no blog tivemos Juan de Mariana, extremista libertário, que instado a escrever um livro para agradar Felipe II, da Espanha [livro dedicado ao filho deste,Felipe III], resolveu fazer uma defesa franca do TIRANICÍDIO, elencou vários tiranos e os colocou como tais, bem como resolveu afirmar que a soberania do Rei vem do povo, na contramão da então crescente apologia ao poder concentrado. Já em outro livro denunciou a prática de alterar o conteúdo das moedas para ganhar um "extra" e,explicitamente, considerou a prática como criminosa. Ou seja, fazer média não era com Juan de Mariana.
 



Em contraste a esse grande homem, apresentamos Carafa, mercantilista, protecionista e que adorava bajular poderosos e, afinal, começou a pensar em termos de "agregados", "indução da economia", entre outras excrecências . A fonte é a mesma do texto anterior [o link está lá, o excerto é da terceira seção do sexto capítulo], que é o importantíssimo livro de Rothbard sobre o pensamento econômico anterior a Adam Smith.
 
"The Florentine humanists of the early fifteenth century had been optimistic for man, for his quest for


virtus (or virtu) or excellence, and for the 'honour, praise, and glory' which more traditional Christians had thought due only to God. It was therefore easy for the later, sixteenth century humanists to transfer that quest for excellence and glory from individual man to being the sole function of the prince. Thus Castiglione declares that the courtier's chief goal, 'the end to which he is directed', must be to advise his prince so that the latter may attain 'the pinnacle of glory' and make himself 'famous and illustrious in the world' .
 
The earlier republican humanists had nurtured the ideal of 'liberty', by which they meant, not the modern concept of individual rights, but republican, generally oIigarchial, 'self-government'. Castiglione expressly condemns such old notions, on behalf of the monarchical virtues of peace, absence of discord, and total obedience to the absolute prince. In The Book of the Courtier, one of the characters in the dialogue protests that princes 'hold their subjects in the closest bondage' so that liberty is gone. Castiglione shrewdly counters, in age-old terms used in numerous apologia for despotism, that such liberty is only a plea that we be allowed to 'live as we like' rather than 'according to good laws'. Since liberty is only licence, then, a monarch is needed to 'establish his people in such laws and ordinances that they may live in ease and peace' .


A leading writer of advice-books to both the prince and the courtier, and a man who bears the dubious distinction of being perhaps the first mercantilist, was the Neapolitan duke, Diomede Carafa (1407-87). Carafa wrote The Perfect Courtier


while serving at the court of Ferdinand, king of Naples, in the 1480s, as well as "The Office of a Good Prince" during
the same period. In The Perfect Courtier, Carafa set the tone for Castiglione's enormously influential work a generation later. In his
Office of a Good Prince, Carafa set the model for the form of economic advice presented by consultant administrators. As in many later works, the book begins with principles of general policy and defence, then goes on to administration of justice, to public finance, and finally economic policy proper.


In detailed policies, Carafa's advice is relatively sensible, and not nearly as totally power-oriented or as statist as later mercantilists advising fully fledged nation-states. The budget should be balanced, since forced loans are comparable to robbery and theft, and taxes should be equitable and moderate in order not to oppress labour or drive capital from the country. Business should be left alone but, on the other hand, Carafa called for subsidies of industry, agriculture, and commerce by the state, as well as substantial welfare expenditures. In contrast to the later mercantilists, foreign merchants, declared Carafa, should be made welcome because their activities are highly useful to the country.
 
But there is no hint in Carafa, in contrast to the scholastics, of any desire to understand or analyse market processes. The only important question was how the ruler can manipulate them. As Schumpeter wrote of Carafa: 'The normal processes of economic life harbored no problem for Carafa. The only problem was how to manage and improve them'.
 
Schumpeter also attributes to Carafa the first conception of a national economy, of the entire country as one large business unit managed by the prince. Carafa was,





so far as I know, the first to deal comprehensively with the economic problems of
the nascent modern state the fundamental idea that Carafa clothed in his conception
of the Good Prince of a National Economy... [which] is not simply the
sum total of the individual households and firms or of the groups and classes within the borders of a state.

It is conceived as a sort of sublimated business unit,
something that has a distinct existence and distinct interests of its own and needs to be managed like a big farm. "


I

terça-feira, 28 de agosto de 2012

The learned extremist: Juan de Mariana


One of the last Spanish scholastics was a Jesuit but not a Salamancan. He was the 'extremist' contemporary of Molina and Suarez, Juan de Mariana (1536-1624). Mariana was born near Toledo, of poor and humble parents. He entered the great University of Alcahi in 1553, shone as a student, and a year later was received into the new Society of Jesus. After completing his studies at Alcala, Mariana went to the Jesuit College at Rome in 1561 to teach philosophy and theology, and after four years moved to Sicily to set up the theology programme at the Jesuit college there. In 1569, Mariana moved to teach theology at the great University of Paris, at the remarkably young age of 33. After four years, ill health forced him to retire to live in Toledo; ill health, however, often does not necessarily mean a short life, and Mariana lived to the then phenomenally ripe old age of 88.
 
Fortunately, Mariana's 'retirement' was an active one, and his great learning and erudition drew numerous persons, from private citizens to state and ecclesiastical authorities, to ask for his advice and guidance. He was able to published two great and influential books. One was a history of Spain, written first in Latin and then in Spanish, which went into many volumes and many editions in both languages. The Latin version was eventually published in 11 volumes, and the Spanish in 30. The Spanish edition has long been considered one of the classics of Spanish style, and it went into many editions until the mid-nineteenth century.
 
The other notable work of Mariana, De Rege (On Kingship), was published in 1599, written at the suggestion of King Philip II of Spain and dedicated to his successor Philip III. But monarchy did not fare well at the hands of the hard-hitting Mariana. A fervent opponent of the rising tide of absolutism in Europe, and of the doctrine of such as King James I of England that kings rule absolutely by divine right, Mariana converted the scholastic doctrine of tyranny from an abstract concept into a weapon with which to smite real monarchs of the past. He denounced such ancient rulers as Cyrus the Great, Alexander the Great, and Julius Caesar as tyrants, who acquired their power by injustice and robbery. Previous scholastics, including Suarez, believed that the people could ratify such unjust usurpation by their consent after the fact, and thereby make their rule legitimate. But Mariana was not so quick to concede the consent of the people. In contrast to other scholastics, who placed the 'ownership' of power in the king, he stressed that the people have a right to reclaim their political power whenever the king should abuse it. Indeed Mariana held that, in transferring their original political power from a state of nature to the king, the people necessarily reserved important rights to themselves; in addition to the right to reclaim sovereignty, they retained such vital powers as taxation, the right to veto laws, and the right to determine succession if the king has no heir. It should already be clear that it was Mariana, rather than Suarez, who might be called the forebear of John Locke's theory of popular consent and the continuing superiority of the people to the government. Furthermore, Mariana also anticipated Locke in holding that men leave the state of nature to form governments in order to preserve their rights of private property. Mariana also went far beyond Suarez in postulating a state of nature, a society, previous .to the institution of government.
 
But the most fascinating feature of the 'extremism' of Mariana's political theory was his creative innovation in the scholastic theory of tyrannicide. That a tyrant might be justly killed by the people had long been standard doctrine; but Mariana broadened it greatly in two significant ways. First, he expanded the definition of tyranny: a tyrant was any ruler who violated the laws of religion, who imposed taxes without the people's consent, or who prevented a meeting of a democratic parliament. All the other scholastics, in contrast, had located the sole power to tax in the ruler. Even more spectacularly, to Mariana any individual citizen can justly assassinate a tyrant and may do so by any means necessary. Assassination did not require some sort of collective decision by the entire people. To be sure, Mariana did not think that an individual should engage in assassination lightly. First, he should try to assemble the people to make this crucial decision. But if that is impossible, he should at least consult some 'erudite and grave men', unless the cry of the people against the tyrant is so starkly manifest that consultation becomes unnecessary.
 
 
Furthermore, Mariana added - in phrases anticipating Locke's and the Declaration of Independence's justification of the right of rebellion - that we need not worry about the public order being greatly disrupted by too many people taking up the practice of tyrannicide. For this is a dangerous enterprise, Mariana sensibly pointed out, and very few are ever ready to risk their lives in that way. On the contrary, most tyrants have not died a violent death, and tyrannicides have almost always been greeted by the populace as heroes. In contrast to the common objections to tyrannicide, he concluded, it would be salutary for rulers to fear the people, and to realize that a lapse into tyranny might cause the people to call them to account for their crimes. Mariana has given us an eloquent description of the typical tyrant at his deadly work:
 
He seizes the property of individuals and squanders it, impelled as he is by the unkingly vices of lust, avarice, cruelty, and fraud .... Tyrants, indeed, try to injure and ruin everybody, but they direct their attack especially against rich and upright men throughout the realm. They consider the good more suspect than the evil; and the virtue which they themselves lack is most formidable to them...They expel the better men from the commonwealth on the principle that whatever is exalted in the kingdom should be laid low... They exhaust all the rest so that they can not unite by demanding new tributes from them daily, by stirring up quarrels among the citizens, and by joining war to war. They build huge works at the expense and by the suffering of the citizens. Whence the pyramids of Egypt were born... The tyrant necessarily fears that those whom he terrorizes and holds as slaves will attempt to overthrow him.... Thus he forbids the citizens to congregate together, to meet in assemblies, and to discuss the commonwealth altogether, taking from them by secret-police methods the opportunity of free speaking and freely listening so that they are not even allowed to complain freely
....
 
 
This 'erudite and grave man', Juan de Mariana, left no doubt what he thought of the most recent famous tyrannicide: that of the French King Henry III. In 1588, Henry III had been prepared to name as his successor Henry of Navarre, a Calvinist who would be ruling over a fiercely Catholic nation. Facing a rebellion by the Catholic nobles, headed by the duc de Guise, and backed by the devoted Catholic citizens of Paris, Henry III called the duke and his brother the cardinal to a peace parley into his camp, and then had the two assassinated. The following year, on the point of conquering the city of Paris, Henry III was assassinated in turn, by a young Dominican friar and member of the Catholic League, Jacques Clement. To Mariana, in this way 'blood was expiated with blood' and the duc de Guise was 'avenged with royal blood'. 'Thus perished Clement', concluded Mariana, 'an eternal ornament of France'. The assassination had similarly been hailed by Pope Sixtus V, and by the fiery Catholic preachers of Paris.
 
The French authorities were understandably edgy about Mariana's theories and at his book De Rege. Finally, in 1610, Henry IV (formerly Henry of Navarre, who had converted from Calvinism to the Catholic faith in order to become king of France), was assassinated by the Catholic resister Ravaillac, who despised the religious centrism and the state absolutism imposed by the king. At that point, France erupted in an orgy of indignation against Mariana, and the parlement of Paris had De Rege burned publicly by the hangman. Before executing Ravaillac, the assassin was questioned closely as to whether reading Mariana had driven him to murder, but he denied ever having heard of him. While the king of Spain refused to heed French pleas to suppress this subversive work, the general of the Jesuit Order issued a decree to his society, forbidding them to teach that it is lawful to kill tyrants. This truckling, however, did not prevent a successful smear campaign in France against the Jesuit Order, as well as its loss of political and theological influence.
 
Juan de Mariana possessed one of the most fascinating personalities in the history of political and economic thought. Honest, gutsy and fearless, Mariana was in hot water almost all of his long life, even for his economic writings. Turning his attention to monetary theory and practice, Mariana, in his brief treatise De Monetae Mutatione (On the Alteration ofMoney, 1609) denounced his sovereign, Philip III, for robbing the people and crippling commerce through the debasement of copper coinage. He pointed out that this debasement also added to Spain's chronic price inflation by increasing the quantity of money in the country. Philip had wiped out his public debt by debasing his copper coins by two-thirds, thereby tripling the supply of copper money.
 
Mariana noted that debasement and government tampering with the market value of money could only cause grave economic problems:
 
Only a fool would try to separate these values in such a way that the legal price
should differ from the natural. Foolish, nay, wicked the ruler who orders that a
thing the common people value, let us say, at five should be sold for ten. Men are
guided in this matter by common estimation founded on considerations of the
quality of things, and of their abundance or scarcity. It would be vain for a Prince
to seek to undermine these principles of commerce. 'Tis best to leave them intact
instead of assailing them by force to the public detriment.
 
Mariana begins De Monetae with a charming and candid apologia for writing the book reminiscent of the great Swedish economist Knut Wicksell over two and a half centuries later: he knows that his criticism of the king courted great unpopularity, but everyone is now groaning under the hardships resulting from the debasement, and yet no one has had the courage to criticize the king's action publicly. Hence, justice requires that at least one man Mariana - should move in to express the common grievance publicly. When a combination of fear and bribery conspire to silence critics, there should be at least one man in the country who knows the truth and has the courage to point it out to one and all.
 
Mariana then proceeds to demonstrate that debasement is a very heavy hidden tax on the private property of his subjects, and that, pace his political theory, no king has the right to impose taxes without the consent of the people. Since political power originated with the people, the king has no rights over the private property of his subjects, nor can he appropriate their wealth by his whim and will. Mariana notes the papal bull Coena Domini, which had decreed the excommunication of any ruler who imposes new taxes. Mariana reasons that any king who practises debasement should incur the same punishment, as should any legal monopoly imposed by the state without the consent of the people. Under such monopolies, the state itself, or its grantee, can sell a product to the public at a price higher than its market worth, and this is surely nothing but a tax.
 
Mariana also set forth a history of debasement and its unfortunate effects; and he pointed out that governments are supposed to maintain all standards of weight and measure, not only of money, and that their record in adulterating those standards is most disgraceful. Castile, for example, had changed its measures of oil and wine, in order to levy a hidden tax, and this led to great confusion and popular unrest.
 
Mariana's book attacking the king's debasement of the currency led the monarch to haul the aged (73-year-old) scholar into prison, charging him with the high crime of lese-majeste. The judges convicted Mariana of this crime against the king, but the pope refused to punish him, and Mariana was finally released from prison after four months on the condition that he would cut out the offensive passages in his work, and that he would be more careful in the future.
 
King Philip and his minions, however, did not leave the fate of the book to an eventual change of heart on the part of Mariana. Instead, the king ordered his officials to buy up every published copy of De Monetae Mutatione they could get their hands on and to destroy them. Not only that; after Mariana's death, the Spanish Inquisition expurgated the remaining copies, deleted many sentences and smeared entire pages with ink. All non-expurgated copies were put on the Spanish Index, and these in turn were expurgated during the seventeenth century. As a result of this savage campaign of censorship, the existence of the Latin text of this important booklet remained unknown for 250 years, and was only rediscovered because the Spanish text was incorporated into a nineteenth century collection of classical Spanish essays. Hence, few complete copies of the booklet survive, of which the only one in the United States is in the Boston Public Library.
 
The venerable Mariana was apparently not in enough trouble; after he was jailed by the king, the authorities seized his notes and papers, and found there a manuscript attacking the existing governing powers in the Society of Jesus. An individualist unafraid to think for himself, Mariana clearly took little stock in the Jesuit ideal of the society as a tightly disciplined military-like body. In this booklet, Discurso de las Enfermedades de fa Compania, Molina smote the Jesuit Order fore and aft, its administration and its training of novices, and he judged his superiors in the Jesuit Order unfit to rule. Above all, Mariana criticized the military-like hierarchy; the general, he concluded, has too much power, and the provincials and other Jesuits too little. Jesuits, he asserted, should at least have a voice in the selection of their immediate superiors.
 
When the Jesuit general, Claudius Aquaviva, found that copies of Mariana's work were circulating in a kind of underground samizdat both inside and outside the order, he ordered Mariana to apologize for the scandal. The feisty and principled Mariana, however, refused to do so, and Aquaviva did not press the issue. As soon as Mariana died, the legion of enemies of the Jesuit Order published the Discurso simultaneously in French, Latin and Italian. As in the case of all bureaucratic organizations, the Jesuits then and since were more concerned about the scandal and not washing dirty linen in public than in fostering freedom of inquiry, self-criticism, or correcting any evils that Mariana might have uncovered. 
 
The Jesuit Order never expelled their eminent member nor did he ever leave. Still he was all his life regarded as a feisty trouble-maker, and as unwilling to bow to orders or peer pressure. Father Antonio Astrain, in his history of the Jesuit Order, notes that 'above all we must bear in mind that his [Mariana's] character was very rough and unmortified'.5 Personally, in a manner similar to the Italian Franciscan saints San Bernardino and Sant'Antonino of the fifteenth century, Mariana was ascetic and austere. He never attended the theatre and he held that priests and monks should never degrade their sacred character by listening to actors. He also denounced the popular Spanish sport of bull-fighting, which was also not calculated to increase his popularity. Gloomily, Mariana would often stress that life was short, precarious, and full of vexation. Yet, despite his austerity, Father Juan de Mariana possessed a sparkling, almost Menckenesque, wit. Thus his oneliner on marriage: 'Some one cleverly said that the first and the last day of marriage are desirable, but that the rest are terrible' .
 
But probably his wittiest remark concerned bull-fighting. His attack on that sport met with the objection that some theologians had defended the validity of bull-fighting. Denouncing theologians who palliated crimes by inventing explanations to please the masses, Mariana delivered a line closely anticipating a favourite remark by Ludwig von Mises on economists over three and a half centuries later: 'there is nothing howsoever absurd which is not defended by some theologian' .

domingo, 26 de agosto de 2012

Thomas Sowell analisa as políticas de ação afirmativa ao redor do mundo


"Há uma tentativa desesperada de manter a pobreza, por parte de quem lucra com ela. As pessoas reclamam que os recursos naturais se esgotaram. Pobreza é um recurso natural de uma classe de ativistas políticos e comunitários e ver a pobreza se acabando na frente deles deve ser muito alarmante." (Thomas Sowell)

sexta-feira, 24 de agosto de 2012

Private School Philanthropy



One notable feature of the private unaided schools in our study is that, although they charge fees and are run on business principles, they also offer free or concessionary (reduced fee) seats to some children. We specifically asked questions about this aspect of private school operation on the school and parent questionnaires as well as in interviews with a small number of parents and school managers. 

[...]Of those schools giving information, 71 percent of unrecognized and 78 percent of recognized private unaided schools offer free places to some students. Regarding concessionary places, 84 percent of unrecognized and 83 percent of recognized private unaided schools offer them. The total number of free seats given was 2,978 (1,731 in unrecognized and 1,247 in recognized private unaided schools), and the total number of concessionary places was 4,768 (2,992 in unrecognized and 1,776 in recognized private unaided schools). 

Out of a total of 43,852 children attending the private unaided schools (i.e., all the schools, including those that don’t offer free or concessionary places), 2,978 were given free seats and 4,768 had concessionary seats. That is, at least 6.8 percent had free places,and 10.9 percent had concessionary seats. Altogether, at least 17.7 percent of children in private unaided schools had free or concessionary places provided for them. Note that these figures do not include schools that didnot report information, so the results should be taken as a low estimate of the actual number of free or concessionary seats. 

Why do private unaided schools offer free or concessionary places? We asked a small number of school managers. Their reasons included such things as the following: “To keep the drop-out rate from increasing.” “To help the poorest parents by providing education at the cheapest rates.” “To uplift the standard of education by offering services to the poorest in the slum areas.” “To help the poor[est] among the poor without any return from them.” “To gain a good reputation for the school within the community.” 

The last answer illustrates that giving free or concessionary places may not only assist those in need but can also be a valuable way of raising the profile and reputation of the school in the community. That is also the case when “very bright” children are assisted. Assisting such children helps the school improve its reputation when exam results are published. Although free or reduced-fee seats may be provided for the purpose of boosting a school’s reputation, clearly very poor families are helped as a result.

domingo, 19 de agosto de 2012

Rothbard, em




Most people - historians not excepted - are tempted to think of economic and cultural progress as being continuous: in every century people are better off than in the one preceding. This comforting assumption had to be given up quite early when the Dark Ages ensued after the collapse of the Roman Empire. But it was generally held that after the 'renaissance' of the eleventh century, progress in western Europe was pretty well linear and continuous 
from that point to the present day. 
It took heroic efforts over many decades for economic historians like Professors Armando Sapori and Robert Sabatino Lopez to finally convince the historical profession that there was a grave
secular decline in most of western Europe from approximately 1300 to the
middle of the fifteenth century; a period which might be called the Late
Middle Ages or the Early Renaissance. This secular decline, mistitled a
'depression', permeated most parts of western Europe with the exception of a
few Italian city-states.
The economic decline was marked by a severe drop in population. Since
the eleventh century, economic growth and prosperity had pulled up population
figures. Total population in western Europe, estimated at

24 million in

the year 1000 AD, had vaulted to 54 million by the year 1340. In little over a
century, from 1340 to 1450, however, the western European population fell
from 54 million to 37 million, a 31 per cent drop in only a century.
The successful battle to establish the fact of the great decline has done
little, however, to establish the cause or causes of this debacle. Focus on the
devastation caused by outbreaks of the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth
century is partially correct, but superficial, for these outbreaks were themselves
partly caused by an economic breakdown and fall in living standards
which began earlier in the century. The causes of the great depression of
western Europe can be summed up in one stark phrase: the newly imposed
domination of the state. During the medieval synthesis of the High Middle
Ages there was a balance between the power of Church and state, with the
Church slightly more powerful. In the fourteenth century that balance was
broken, and the nation-state came to hold sway, breaking the power of the
Church, taxing, regulating, controlling and wreaking devastation through
virtually continuous war for over a century (the Hundred Years' War, from
1337 to 1453).1
The first and critically most important step in the rise in the power of the
state at the expense of crippling the economy was the destruction of the fairs
of Champagne. During the High Middle Ages, the fairs of Champagne were
the main mart for international trade, and the hub of local and international
commerce. These fairs had been carefully nurtured by being made free zones,
untaxed or unregulated by the French kings or nobles, while justice was
swiftly and efficiently meted out by competing private and merchants' courts.


68 Economic thought before Adam Smith


The fairs of Champagne reached their peak during the thirteenth century, and
provided the centre for land-based trade over the Alps from northern Italy,
bearing goods from afar.
Then, in the early fourteenth century, Philip IV, the Fair, king of France
(1285-1314), moved to tax, plunder, and effectively destroy the vitally important
fairs of Champagne. To finance his perpetual dynastic wars, Philip
levied a stiff sales tax on the Champagne fairs. He also destroyed domestic
capital and finance by repeated confiscatory levies on groups or organizations
with money. In 1308, he destroyed the wealthy Order of the Templars, confiscating
their funds for the royal treasury. Philip then turned to impose a series
of crippling levies and confiscations on Jews and northern Italians ('Lombards')
prominent at the fairs: in 1306, 1311, 1315, 1320 and 1321. Furthermore, at
war with the Flemings, Philip broke the long-time custom that all merchants
were welcome at the fairs, and decreed the exclusion of the Flemings. The
result of these measures was a rapid and permanent decline of the fairs of
Champagne and of the trading route over the Alps. Desperately, the Italian
city-states began to reconstitute trade routes and sail around the Straits of
Gibraltar to Bruges, which began to flourish even though the rest of Flanders
was in decay.
It was particularly fateful that Philip the Fair inaugurated the system of
regular taxation in France. Before then, there were no regular taxes. In the
medieval era, while the king was supposed to be all-powerful in his own
sphere, that sphere was restricted by the sanctity of private property. The king
was supposed to be an armed enforcer and upholder of the law, and his
revenues were supposed to derive from rents on royal lands, feudal dues and
tolls. There was nothing that we would call regular taxation. In an emergency,
such as an invasion or the launching of a crusade, the prince, in
addition to invoking the feudal duty of fighting on his behalf, might ask his
vassals for a subsidy; but that aid would be requested rather than ordered, and
be limited in duration to the emergency period.
The perpetual wars of the fourteenth and the first half of the fifteenth
centuries began in the 1290s, when Philip the Fair, taking advantage of King
Edward I of England's war with Scotland and Wales, seized the province of
Gascony from England. This launched a continuing warfare between England
and Flanders on the one side, and France on the other, and led to a
desperate need for funds by both the English and the French Crowns.
The merchants and capitalists at the fairs of Champagne might have money,
but the largest and most tempting source for royal plunder was the Catholic
Church. Both the English and French monarchs proceeded to tax the Church,
which brought them into a collision course with the pope. Pope Boniface VIII
(1294-1303) stoutly resisted this new form of pillage, and prohibited the
monarchs from taxing the Church. King Edward reacted by denying justice in


From Middle Ages to Renaissance 69


the royal courts to the Church, while Philip was more militant by prohibiting
the transfer of Church revenue from France to Rome. Boniface was forced to
retreat and to allow the tax, but his bull

Unam Sanctam (1302) insisted that

temporal authority must be subordinate to the spiritual. That was enough for
Philip, who boldly seized the pope in Italy and prepared to try him for heresy,
a trial only cut off by the death of the aged Boniface. At this point Philip the
Fair seized the papacy itself, and brought the seat of the Roman Catholic
Church from Rome to Avignon, where he proceeded to designate the pope
himself. For virtually the entire fourteenth century, the pope, in his 'Babylonian
captivity', was an abject tool of the French king; the pope only returned to
Italy in the early fifteenth century.
In this way, the once mighty Catholic Church, dominant power and spiritual
authority during the High Middle Ages, had been brought low and made
a virtual vassal of the royal plunderer of France.
The decline of Church authority, then, was matched by the rise in the
power of the absolute state. Not content with confiscating, plundering, taxing,
crushing the fairs of Champagne, and bringing the Catholic Church
under his heel, Philip the Fair also obtained revenue for his eternal wars by
debasement of the coinage and thereby generated a secular inflation.
The wars of the fourteenth century did not cause a great deal of

direct

devastation: armies were small and hostilities were intermittent. The main
devastation came from the heavy taxes and from the monetary inflation and
borrowing to finance the eternal royal adventures. The enormous increase of
taxation was the most crippling aspect of the wars. The expenses of war:
recruitment of the modestly sized army; payments of its wages; supplies; and
fortifications - all cost from two- to fourfold the ordinary expenses of the
Crown. Add to that the' high costs of tax assessment and enforcement and the
cost of the loans, and the crippling burden of war taxation becomes all too
clear.
The new taxes were everywhere. We have seen the grave effect of taxes on
the Church; on a large monastic farm, they often absorbed over 40 per cent of
the net profits of the farm. A uniform poll tax of one shilling, levied by the
English Crown in 1380, inflicted great hardship on peasants and craftsmen.
The tax amounted to one month's wages for agricultural workers and one
week's wages for urban labourers; moreover, since many poor workers and
peasants were paid in kind rather than money, amassing the money to pay the
tax was particularly difficult.
Other new taxes levied were

ad valorem on all transactions; taxes on

wholesale and retail beverages; and levies on salt and wool. To combat
evasion of the tax, the governments established monopoly markets for the
sale of salt in France and 'staple points' for English wool. The taxes restricted
supply and raised prices, crippling the critical English wool trade.


70 Economic thought before Adam Smith


Production and trade were hampered further by massive requisitions levied
by the kings, thus causing a drastic fall of income and wealth, as well as
bankruptcies among the producers. In short, consumers suffered from artificially
high prices and producers from low returns, with the king bleeding the
economy of the differential. Government borrowing was scarcely more helpful,
leading to repeated defaults by the kings and consequent heavy losses
and bankruptcies among the private bankers unwise enough to lend to the
government.
Originating as a response to wartime 'emergency', the new taxes tended to
become permanent: not only because the warfare lasted for over a century,
but because the state, always on the lookout for an increase in its income and
power, seized upon the golden opportunity to convert wartime taxes into a
permanent part of the national heritage.
From the middle to the end of the fourteenth century, Europe was struck
with the devastating pandemic of the Black Death - the bubonic plague which
in the short span of

1348-50 wiped out fully one-third of the population.

The Black Death was largely the consequence of people's lowered
living standards caused by the great depression and the resulting ··loss of
resistance to disease. The plague continued to recur, though not in such
virulent form, in every decade of the century.
Such are the great recuperative powers of the human race that this enormous
tragedy caused virtually no lasting catastrophic social or psychological
effects among the European population. In a sense, the longest-lasting ill
effect from the Black Death was the response of the English Crown in
imposing permanent maximum wage control and compulsory labour rationing
upon English society. The sudden decline of population and consequent
doubling of wage rates was met by the government's severe imposition of
maximum wage control in the Ordinance of

1349 and the Statue of Labourers

of 1351. Maximum wage control was established at the behest of the employing
classes: large, middle and small landlords, and master craftsmen, the
former groups in particular alarmed at the rise of agricultural wage rates. The
ordinance and the statute defied economic law by attempting to enforce
maximum wage control at the old pre-plague levels. The inevitable result,
however, was a grave shortage of labour, since at the statutory maximum
wage the demand for labour was enormously greater than the newly scarce
supply.
Every government intervention creates new problems in the course of vain
attempts to solve the old. The government is then confronted with the choice:
pile on new interventions to solve the inexplicable new problems, or repeal
the original intervention. Government's instinct, of course, is to maximize its
wealth and power by adding new interventions. So did the English Statute of
Labourers, which imposed forced labour at the old wage rates for all men in


From Middle Ages to Renaissance 71


England under the age of 60; restricted the mobility of labour, declaring that
the lord of a particular territory had first claim on a man's labour; and made it
a criminal offence for an employer to hire a worker who had left a former
master. In that way, the English government engaged in labour rationing to
try to freeze labourers at their pre-plague occupations at pre-plague wages.
This forced rationing of labour cut against the natural inclination of men to
leave for more employment at better wages, and so the inevitable rise of
black markets for labour made enforcement of the statutes difficult. The
desperate English Crown tried once again, in the Cambridge Statute of 1388,
to make the rationing more rigorous. Labour mobility of any sort was prohibited
without written permission from local justices, and compulsory child
labour was imposed in agriculture. But there was continual evasion of this
compulsory buyers' cartel, especially by large employers, who were particularly
eager and able to pay higher wage rates. The cumbersome English
judicial machinery was totally ineffective in enforcing the legislation, although
the monopolistic urban guilds (monopolies enforced by government)
were able to partially enforce wage control in the cities.


3.2 Absolutism and nominalism: the break-up of Thomism


Along with the rise of the absolute state, theories of absolutism arose and
began to throw natural law doctrines into the shade. The adoption of natural
law theory, after all, meant that the state was bound to limit itself to the
dictates of the natural or the divine law. But new political theorists arose,
asserting the dominance of the temporal over the spiritual, and of the state's
positive law over the natural or divine order.

terça-feira, 7 de agosto de 2012

Relacionado ao anterior postado

O post é de lew rockweell jr., mas a citação que o começa [e que está logo abaixo] é de Mises. Há relação com o último texto aqui selecionado, de Bastiat. Vivas ao livre mercado!


"Where there is free trade, foreign competition would even in the short run frustrate the aims sought by the various measures of government intervention with domestic business. When the domestic market is not to some extent insulated from foreign markets, there can be no question of government control. The further a nation goes on the road toward public regulation and regimentation, the more it is pushed toward economic isolation. International division of labor becomes suspect because it hinders the full use of national sovereignty. The trend toward autarky is essentially a trend of domestic economic policies; it is the outcome of the endeavor to make the state paramount in economic matters"

bastiat, em "there are no absolute principles"

We cannot wonder enough at the facility with which men resign themselves to continue ignorant of what it is most important that they should know; and we may be certain that such ignorance is incorrigible in those who venture to proclaim this axiom: There are no absolute principles. You enter the legislative precincts. The subject of debate is whether the law should prohibit international exchanges, or proclaim freedom.

A deputy rises, and says: If you tolerate these exchanges the foreigner will inundate you with his products: England with her textile fabrics, Belgium with coals, Spain with wools, Italy with silks, Switzerland with cattle, Sweden with iron, Prussia with wheat; so that home industry
will no longer be possible.

Another replies— If you prohibit international exchanges, the various bounties which nature has lavished on different climates will be for you as if they did not exist. You cannot participate in the mechanical skill of the English, in the wealth of the Belgian mines, in the fertility of the Polish soil, in the luxuriance of the Swiss pastures, in the cheapness of Spanish labor, in the warmth of the Italian climate; and you must obtain from an unprofitable and misdirected production those commodities which, through exchange, would have been furnished to you by an easy production.

Assuredly, one of these deputies must be wrong. But which? We must take care to make no mistake on the subject, for this is not a matter of abstract opinion merely. You have to choose between two roads, and one of them leads necessarily to poverty. To get rid of the dilemma we are told that there are no absolute principles.

This axiom, which is so much in fashion nowadays, not only countenances indolence, but ministers to ambition. If the theory of prohibition comes to prevail, or if the doctrine of Free Trade comes to triumph, one brief enactment will constitute our whole economic code. In the first case, the law will proclaim that all exchanges with foreign countries are prohibited; in the second, that all exchanges with foreign countries are free; and many grand and distinguished personages will thereby lose
their importance.

But if exchange does not possess a character that is peculiar to it; if it is not governed by any natural law; if, capriciously, it be sometimes useful and sometimes detrimental; if it does not find its motive force in the good it accomplishes, its limit in the good it ceases to accomplish; if its consequences cannot be estimated by those who effect exchanges—in a word, if there be no absolute principles, then we must proceed to weigh, balance, and regulate transactions, we must equalize the conditions of labor, and try to find out the average rate of profits—a colossal task, well deserving the large emoluments and powerful influence awarded to those who undertake it.

On entering Paris, which I had come to visit, I said to myself— here are a million human beings who would all die in a short time if provisions of every kind ceased to flow toward this great metropolis. Imagination is baffled when it tries to appreciatethe vast multiplicity of commodities that must enter tomorrow through the barriers in order to preserve the inhabitants from falling a prey to the convulsions of famine, rebellion and pillage. And yet all sleep at this moment, and their peaceful slumbers are not disturbed for a single instant by the prospect of such a frightful catastrophe. On the other hand, eighty departments have been laboring today, without concert, without any mutual understanding, for the provisioning of Paris. How does each succeeding day bring what is wanted, nothing more, nothing less, to so gigantic a market? What, then, is the ingenious and secret power that governs the astonishing regularity of movements so complicated, a regularity in which everybody has implicit faith, although happiness and life itself are at stake? That power is an absolute
principle, the principle of freedom in transactions. We have faith in that inward light that Providence has placed in the heart of all men, and to which He has confided the preservation and indefinite amelioration of our species, namely, a regard to personal interest—since we must give it its right name—a principle so active, so vigilant, so foreseeing, when it is free in its action. In what situation, I would ask, would the inhabitants of Paris be if a minister should take it into his head to substitute for this power the combinations of his own genius, however superior we might suppose them to be—if he thought to subject to his supreme direction this prodigious mechanism, to hold the springs of it in his hands, to decide by whom, or in what manner, or on what  conditions, everything needed should be produced, transported, exchanged and consumed? Truly, there may be much suffering within the walls of Paris—poverty, despair, perhaps starvation, causing more tears to flow than ardent charity is able to dry up; but I affirm that it is probable, nay, that it is certain, that the arbitrary intervention of government would multiply infinitely those sufferings, and spread over all our fellow-citizens those evils which at present affect only a small number of them.

This faith, then, which we repose in a principle, when the question relates only to our home transactions, why should we not retain when the same principle is applied to our international transactions, which are undoubtedly less numerous, less delicate, and less complicated? And if it is not necessary that the municipality should regulate our Parisian industries, weigh our chances, balance our profits and losses, see that our circulating medium is not exhausted, and equalize the conditions of our home labor, why should it be necessary that the customhouse, departing from its fiscal duties, should pretend to exercise a protective action over our external commerce?