A Defesa Moral do Capitalismo

Constituição Cidadã é o meu P...

Selva Brasilis achou um belo paper a respeito. É sobre a [má] influência de nossa amada Constituição no mercado de trabalho, sobretudo o informal. Título do trabalho: "Institutions, Informality, and Wage Flexibility: Evidence from Brazil ". É, amigos, se corruptos e petralhas em geral não estão nem aí para nossas Leis e para nossa Constituição isso não quer dizer, automaticamente, que as mesmas Leis e Constituição são veneráveis, fruto da mais incrível sapiência legislativa do Planeta, quiçá do Universo. Digamos que haja uma Lei que institua que insira aqui o crime que mais te repulsa seja apenado com duas semanas de cadeia. É claro que é pouco, assim como também claro que seria pior se o mesmo crime não fosse sequer considerado uma infração penal; além do que, homens de bem, independentemente disso, não sairão cometendo crimes a torto e a direito. Isso quer dizer que a Lei, do jeito que está escrita, está de bom tamanho? Quer dizer que precisamos ser ferrenhos defensores da mesma como se a "alternativa" fosse não termos Lei alguma? Precisamos saber separar um pouco mais as coisas, uma coisa é peticionar de acordo com as estritas regras do jogo, outra é aceitar ~sedentariamente~ as mesmas como são com medo de, ao criticá-las, parecer que o que se quer é a ausência de regras.

Rothbard em Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism, and the Division of Labor

"Karl Marx was vague and cloudy in describing the communist ideal, let alone the specific path for attaining it. But one essential feature is the eradication of the division of labor. Contrary to current belief, Marx’s now popular concept of “alienation” had little to do with a psychological sense of apartness or discontent. The heart of the concept was the individual’s “alienation” from the product of labor. A worker, for example, works in a steel mill. Obviously, he himself will consume little or none of the steel he produces; he earns the value of his product in the shape of a money-commodity, and then he happily uses that money to buy whatever he chooses from the products of other people. Thus, A produces steel, B eggs, C shoes, etc., and then each exchanges them for products of the others through the use of money. To Marx this phenomenon of the market and the division of labor was a radical evil, for it meant that no one consumed any of his own product. The steelworker thus became “alienated” from his steel, the shoemaker from his shoes, etc.

The proper response to this “problem,” it seems to me, is: “So what?” Why should anyone care about this sort of “alienation”? Surely the farmer, shoemaker, and steelworker are very happy to sell their product and exchange it for whatever products they desire; deprive them of this “alienation” and they would be most unhappy, as well as dying from starvation. For if the farmer were not allowed to produce more wheat or eggs than he himself consumes, or the shoemaker more shoes than he can wear, or the Steelworker more steel than he can use, it is clear that the great bulk of the population would rapidly starve and the rest be reduced to a primitive subsistence, with life “nasty, brutish, and short.” But to Marx this condition was the evil result of individualism and capitalism and had to be eradicated.

Furthermore, Marx was completely ignorant of the fact that each participant in the division of labor cooperates through the market economy, exchanging for each other’s products and increasing the productivity and living standards of everyone. To Marx, differences between men and, therefore, any specialization in the division of labor, is a “contradiction,” and the communist goal is to replace that “contradiction” with harmony among all. This means that to the Marxist any individual differences, any diversity among men, are “contradictions” to be stamped out and replaced by the uniformity of the antheap. Friedrich Engels maintained that the emergence of the division of labor shattered the alleged classless harmony and uniformity of primitive society, and was responsible for the cleavage of society into separate and conflicting classes. Hence, for Marx and Engels, the division of labor must be eradicated in order to abolish class conflict and to usher in the ideal harmony of the “classless society,”

the society of total uniformity"


[...]

"This absurd ideal—of the man “able to do everything”—is only viable if (a) everyone does everything very badly, or (b) there are only a very few things to do, or (c) everyone is miraculously transformed into a superman. Professor Mises aptly notes that the ideal communist man is the dilettante, the man who knows a little of everything and does nothing well. For how can he develop any of his powers and faculties if he is prevented from developing any one of them to any sustained extent? As Mises says of Bebel’s Utopia, 

Art and science are relegated to leisure hours. In this way, thinks Bebel, the society of the future “will possess scientists and artists of all kinds in countless numbers.” These, according to their several inclinations, will pursue their studies and their arts in their spare time. . . . All mental work he regards as mere dilettantism. . . . But nevertheless we must inquire whether under these conditions the mind would be able to create that freedom without which it cannot exist.

Obviously all artistic and scientific work which demands time, travel, technical education and great material expenditure, would be quite out of the question.

Every person’s time and energy on the earth are necessarily limited; hence, in order to develop any of his faculties to the full, he must specialize and concentrate on some rather than others. As Gray

writes,

That each individual should have the opportunity of developing all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions, is a dream which will cheer the vision only of the simple-minded, oblivious of the restrictions imposed by the narrow limits of human life. For life is a series of acts of choice, and each choice is at the same time a renunciation. . . .

Even the inhabitant of Engels’ future fairyland will have to decide sooner or later whether he wishes to be Archbishop of Canterbury or First Sea Lord, whether he should seek to excel as a violinist or as a pugilist, whether he should elect to know all about Chinese literature or about the hidden pages in the life of the mackerel.

Of course, the only way to resolve this dilemma is to fantasize that the New Communist Man will be a superman. The Marxist, Karl Kautsky, asserted that in the future society “a new type of man will arise . . . a superman . . . an exalted man.” Leon Trotsky prophesied that under communism 

man will become incomparably stronger, wiser, finer. His body more harmonious, his movements more rhythmical, his voice more musical. . . . THE HUMAN AVERAGE WILL RISE TO THE LEVEL OF AN ARISTOTLE, A GOETHE, A MARX. Above these other heights new peaks will arise."

Anarcocapitalismo vs. Minarquismo (Juliano Torres vs. Flavio Morgenstern)

Rothbard

capítulo 36 daqui: http://mises.org/books/economic_controversies_rothbard.pdf

'In order to discuss the “future of capitalism,” we must first decide what the meaning of the term “capitalism” really is. Unfortunately, the term “capitalism” was coined by its greatest and most famous enemy, Karl Marx. We really can’t rely upon him for correct and subtle usage. And, in fact, what Marx and later writers have done is to lump together two extremely different and even contradictory concepts and actions under the same portmanteau term. These two contradictory concepts are what I would call “free-market capitalism” on the one hand, and “state capitalism” on the other. 

The difference between free-market capitalism and state capitalism is precisely the difference between, on the one hand, peaceful, voluntary exchange, and on the other, violent expropriation. An example of a free-market exchange is my purchase of a newspaper on the corner for a dime; here is a peaceful, voluntary exchange beneficial to both parties. I buy the newspaper because I value the newspaper more highly than the dime that I give up in exchange; and the newsdealer sells me the paper because, he, in turn, values the dime more highly than the newspaper. Both parties to the exchange benefit. And what we are both doing in the exchange is the swapping of titles of ownership: I relinquish the ownership of my dime in exchange for the paper, and the newsdealer performs the exact opposite change of title. This simple exchange of a dime for a newspaper is an example of a unit free-market act; it is the market at work.

In contrast to this peaceful act, there is the method of violent expropriation. Violent expropriation occurs when I go to the newsdealer and seize his newspapers or his money at the point of a gun. In this case, of course, there is no mutual benefit; I gain at the expense of the victimized newsdealer. Yet the difference between these two transactions—between voluntary mutual exchange, and the holdup at gunpoint—is precisely the difference between free market capitalism and state capitalism. In both cases we obtain something—whether it be money or newspapers—but we obtain them in completely different ways, ways with completely different moral attributes and social consequences. 

Here I can’t resist the temptation of pointing out that I have an entirely different interpretation of Jefferson and Hamilton from that of Professor Averitt. I don’t regard Jefferson as some sort of early Franz Boas type, an early Left-Wing anthropologist. He wasn’t. My reading of Jefferson is completely different; on my reading, Jefferson was very precisely in favor of laissez-faire, or free-market, capitalism. And that was the real argument between them. It wasn’t really that Jefferson was against factories or industries per se; what he was against was coerced development, that is, taxing the farmers through tariffs and subsidies to build up industry artificially, which was essentially the Hamilton program. 

Jefferson, incidentally, along with other statesmen of his time, was a very learned person. He read Adam Smith, he read Ricardo, he was very familiar with laissez-faire classical economics. And so his economic programs far from being the expression of bucolic agrarian nostalgia, was a very sophisticated application of classical economics to the American scene. We must not forget that laissez-faire classicists were also against tariffs, subsidies, and coerced economic development.

Furthermore, the term “equality,” as used by Jefferson and Jeffersonians, was employed in the same  sense as Jefferson’s friend and colleague George Mason used when he framed the Virginia Declaration of Rights shortly before Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence: “that all men are by nature equally free and independent.” In other words, “equality” did not then mean what we often mean by equality now: equality of condition or uniformity. “Equality” meant that each person has the right to be equally free and independent, to enjoy the right to “equal liberty,” as Herbert Spencer would phrase it a century later. In other words, again what I am saying is that the Jeffersonian wing of the Founding Fathers was essentially free-market, laissez-faire capitalists.

To return to the market: the free market is really a vast network, a latticework, of these little, unit exchanges which I mentioned before: such as exchanging a dime for a newspaper. At each step of the way, there are two people, or two groups of people, and these two people or groups exchange two commodities, usually money and another commodity; at each step, each benefits by the exchange, otherwise they wouldn’t be making it in the first place. If it turns out that they were mistaken in thinking that the exchange would benefit them then they quickly stop, and they don’t make the exchange again.

Another common example of a free market is the universal practice of children swapping baseball cards—the sort of thing where you swap “two Hank Aaron[s]” for “one Willie Mays.” The “prices” of the various cards, and the exchanges that took place, were based on the relative importance that the kids attached to each baseball player. As one way of annoying liberals we might put the case this way: liberals are supposed to be in favor of any voluntary actions performed, as the famous cliché goes, by “two consenting adults.” Yet it is peculiar that while liberals are in favor of any sexual activity engaged in by two consenting adults, when these consenting adults engage in trade or exchange, the liberals step in to harass, cripple, restrict, or prohibit that trade. And yet both the consenting sexual activity and the trade are similar expressions of liberty in action. Both should be favored by any consistent libertarian. But the government, especially a liberal government, habitually steps in to regulate and restrict such trade. 

It is very much as though I were about to exchange two Hank Aarons for one Willie Mays, and the government, or some other third party, should step in and say: “No, you can’t do that; that’s evil; it’s against the common good. We hereby outlaw this proposed exchange; any exchange of such baseball cards must be one for one, or three for two”—or whatever other terms the government, in its wisdom and greatness, arbitrarily wishes to impose. By what right do they do this? The libertarian claims, by no right whatsoever."

O Governo é Mágica

Guia politicamente incorreto da América Latina, Ed. LeYa, pp. 133/7

OU SE É BOLIVARIANO OU MARXISTA. OS DOIS? NÃO DÁ

"Sendo Bolívar hoje um ícone dos marxistas, emprestamos o centro do auditório para que o alemão KARL MARX, o pai intelectual da esquerda, nos intriduza às particularidades desse personagem tão importante na América Latina. Por um capricho da história, em 1857, Marx foi contratado pelo diretor do jornal New York Daily Tribune para escrever alguns verbetes para uma tal New American Cyclopaedia.

Entre suas atribuições, ele foi encarregado de resumir a vida de Bolívar, que tinha morrido de tuberculose 27 anos antes. Inicia, assim, o texto de Marx:

Bolívar y Ponte, Simón, o "libertador" da Colômbia, nasceu em Caracas, em 24 de julho de 1783, e faleceu em San Pedro, perto de Santa Marta, em 17 de dezembro de 1830. Era filho de uma das famílias mantuanas que, no período da supremacia espanhola, costituíam a nobreza criolla da Venezuela.

O verbete, então, segue contando as aventuras do comandante, incluindo traições a seus companheiros, como Francisco de Miranda, que encarregara Bolívar de tomar conta da fortaleza de Porto Cabello:

Quando os prisioneiros de guerra espanhóis, que Miranda costumava confinar na fortaleza de Porto Cabello, conseguiram dominar de surpresa os guardas e tomar a cidadela, Bolívar - apesar de os prisioneiros estarem desarmados, ao passo que ele dispunha de uma guarnição numerosa e uma grande quantidade de munição - fugiu precipitadamente durante a noite com oito de seus oficiais, sem informar seus próprios soldados. Ao tomar conhecimento da fuga de seu comandante, a guarnição retirou-se ordeiramente do local, que foi ocupado de imediato pelos espanhóis.

É a primeira narração de Marx de uma fuga covarde de Bolívar. Ao todo, há outras cinco. Outra é esta aqui, quando Marx relata o depoinmento de uma testemunha:

Quando os combatentes [espanhóis] dispersaram a guarda avançada de Bolívar, segundo o registro de uma testemunha ocular, este perdeu toda a presença de espírito, não disse palavra, fez meia-volta no ato  com o cavalo, fugiu a toda velocidade para Ocumare, passou pelo vilarejo num galope desabalado, chegou à baía próxima, apeou de um saltos, entrou num bote e embarcou no Diana, deixando todos os seus companheiros provados de qualquer auxílio.

Para Marx, Bolívar também era despótico e egocêntrico. A idéia fixa do venezuelano era criar uma única República, que seria resultante da independência de várias colônias: "Eu desejo, mais do que qualquer outro, ver formar-se na América a maior nação do mundo, menos por sua extensão e riquezas do que pela liberdade e glória", escreveu ele em uma carta na Jamaica em 1815. Em 1826, com a Espanha fora da região, o Libertador organizou um congresso no Panamá com representantes de vários países de toda a América do Sul. Convidou até mesmo diplomatas do Brasil. Segundo o pensador alemão:

O que Bolívar realmente almejava era erigir toda a América do Sul como uma única república federativa, tendo nele seu próprio ditador. Enquanto, dessa maneira, dava plena vazão a seus sonhos de ligar meio mundo a seu nome, o poder efetivo lhe escapou da mãos.

No ano seguinte, em 1827, Bolívar voltou à Venezuela após cinco anos lutando contra soldados que defendiam a Espanha na Colômbia, no Peru e na Bolívia. Os interesses dos espanhóis eram guarnecidos por apenas mil soldados, a maioria deles americanos doentes e mal equipados. Para ajudá-los, a Espanha enviou sua maior expedição militar para a colônia em trÊs séculos de dominação e reforços anuais. "Mas o tamanho excedia a moral, e uma vez na América os números eram reduzidos pela morte ou deserção. Os soldados espanhóis eram conscritos (alistados obrigatoriamente), não voluntários. A Guerra Colonial não era uma causa popular na Espanha, e nem os soldados, nem os oficiais queriam arriscar suas vidas na América, muito menos na Venezuela, onde o ambiente de luta era notoriamente cruel", escreveu John Lynch.

Para confrontá-los, Bolívar e seus parceiros criollos contaram com a ajuda dos ingleses. Após as guerras com Napoleão, havia milhares de soldados desempregados ou com baixos salários na Grã-Bretanha. Ansiavam tanto por um convite para lutar na América do Sul que treinavam voluntariamente durante o dia em Londres. Ao chegar à Venezuela, passaram a ser conhecidos como bons marchadores, pois deixavam os soldados locais sempre para trás nos grandes deslocamentos de tropas. A Batalha de Boyacá, ocorrida quando Bolívar entrou na Colômbia e a qual o libertador considerava "minha mais completa vitória", foi vencida graças aos ingleses, que também venderam rifles, pistolas e espadas aos republicanos.

No retorno à Venezuela, quem recebeu Bolívar foi o general José Antonio Páez, que ajudara a debandar as tropas da metrópole e, trÊs anos depois, se tornaria presidente da Venezuela. em sua aula, o professor Marx nos conta então como se dá a entrada apoteótica do Libertador em Caracas:

De pé sobre um carro triunfal, puxado por 12 jovens vestidas de branco e enfeitadas com as cores nacionais, todas escolhidas entre as melhores famílias de Caracas, Bolívar, com a cabeça descoberta e uniforme de gala, agitando um pequeno bastão, foi conduzido por cerca de meia hora, desde a entrada da cidade até sua residência. Proclamando-se "Diretor eLibertador das Províncias Ocidentais da Venezuela]', criou a "Ordem do Libertador", formou uma tropa de elite que denominou de sua guarda pessoal e se cercou de pompa própria de uma corte. Entretanto, como a maioria de seus compatriotas, ele era avesso a qualquer esforço prolongado, e sua ditadura não tardou a degenerar numa anarquia militar, na qual os assuntos mais importantes eram deixados nas mãos de favoritos, que arruinavam as finanças públicas e depois recorriam a meios odiosos para reorganizá-las.

Ao ser questionado se não teria exagerado na crítica ao descrever uma pessoa com tantas conquistas, Marx respondeu o seguinte em uma carta ao camarada Friedrich Engels:

Seria ultrapassar os limites querer apresentar como Napoleão I o mais covarde, brutal e miserável dos canalhas."

[fontes das citações: Simón Bolívar por Karl Marx, Martins Fontes, 2008; Simón Bolívar, a life de John Lynch, Yale University Press, 2006;  carta de Jamaica, disponível em www.analitica.com/bitbliotecarob/bitblioteca/bitblioteca/bolivar/jamaica.asp. ]

Rothbard em Conceived in Liberty, capítulo 18

"In mid-December 1620 the Mayflower landed at Plymouth. In a duplication of the terrible hardships of the first Virginia settlers, half of the colonists were dead by the end of the first winter. In mid-1621 John Peirce and Associates obtained a patent from the Council for New England, granting the company 100 acres of land for each settler and 1,500 acres compulsorily reserved for public use. In return, the Council was to receive a yearly quitrent of two shillings per 100 acres.

A major reason for the persistent hardships, for the "starving time," in Plymouth as before in Jamestown, was the communism imposed by the company. Finally, in order to survive, the colony in 1623 permitted each family to cultivate a small private plot of land for their individual use. William Bradford, who had become governor of Plymouth in 1621, and was to help rule the colony for thirty years thereafter, eloquently describes the result in his record of the colony:

All this while no supply was heard of. . . . So they began to think how they might raise as much corn as they could, and obtain a better crop than they had done, that they might not still thus languish in misery. At length . . . the Governor (with the advice of the chiefest among them) gave way that they should set corn every man for his own particular, and in that regard trust to themselves. . . . And so assigned to every family a parcel of land . . . for that end, only for present use. . . . This had very good success, for it made all hands very industrious, so as much more corn was planted than otherwise would have been by any means the Governor or any other could use, and saved him a great deal of trouble, and gave far better content. The women now went willingly into the field, and took their little ones with them to set corn; which before would allege weakness and inability; whom to have compelled would have been thought great tyranny and oppression. The experience that was had in this common course and condition, tried sundry years and that amongst godly and sober men, may well evince the vanity of that conceit of Plato's . . . that the taking away of property and bringing community into a commonwealth would make them happy and flourishing. . . . For this community . . . was found to breed much confusion and discontent and retard much employment that would have been to their benefit and comfort. For the young men, that were most able and fit for labour and service, did repine that they should spend their time and strength to work for other men's wives and children without any recompense. The strong . . . had no more in division of victuals and clothes than he that was weak and not able to do a quarter the other could; this was thought injustice.   . . . Upon . . . all being to have alike, and all to do alike, they thought . . . one as good as another, and so . . . did . . . work diminish . . . the mutual respects that should be preserved amongst men. . . . Let none object this is men's corruption . . . all men have this corruption in them. . . .

 The antipathy of communism to the nature of man here receives eloquent testimony from a governor scarcely biased a priori in favor of individualism."

Jorge deve ajudar

GERADOR DE LOROTA

Que tal um vídeo com exemplos de alguns clichÊzinhos que se já são idiotas sozinhos quando acompanhados levam a idiotia a um novo nível? Digamos, para fazer bonito em uma reunião de DCE, numa mesa de boêmia bolchevique aonde esteja uma gatinha que ao menos cursou jornalismo e apesar da ripongagem de boutique e do Marxismo-leninismo-or-whathever toma banho[s] todo dia e é limpinha. Ou, quem sabe, até em conferência da ONU...

O WAIT! Mas é o GRANDE TCHÊ, O Guevara! E em um discurso da ONU! Após começar sendo modesto ao dizer que em apenas um mÊs conseguiu vários avanços econômicos e que a platéia ainda verá muitos mais,  podem guardar os aplausos, ele emenda:

“Uma vez conversávamos que era necessário criar esse espírito criativo no trabalhador para que ajudem os técnicos e os responsáveis administrativos a melhorar a qualidade de trabalho e a extrair toda essa grande riqueza potencial que está em nosso SUBSOLO, em nossos ARMAZÉNS e que não podemos coordenar por FALTA DE MATÉRIAS PRIMAS, por falta de uma tecnologia adequada, POR FALTA DE ORGANIZAÇÃO, o que não nos permite cumprir cabalmente nossos projetos.

É verdade que temos o bloqueio imperialista e continuaremos a tê-lo durante algum tempo, ATÉ QUE SE CANSEM ou que ocorram acontecimentos de OUTRO TIPO.”

[BASICAMENTE ele começa logo a chamar o proletariado de burro e afirmar que gostaria que fossem mais espertos para poderem interagir com os técnicos e responsáveis administrativos. Imaginei a cena de cientistas em laboratório a tentarem se entender com as cobaias. Mas isso não existe com “organismos sociais”, né senhores comunas? Seria, err, TOO NAZI.]

Apesar do rápido, notável e aplaudidíssimo crescimento econômico em apenas um mês de gobierno [Fidel teve a brilhante idéia de encarregar TCHÊ como ministro da fazenda-indústria-finanças, daí já viram], além de, claro, as riquezas de subsolos E DOS ARMAZÉNS [não consigo deixar de me espantar com a jenyalidade de semelhante raciocínio. Como se os bens em um armazém fossem na base do Fiat isso, Fiat aquilo] é uma pena que faltem matérias-primas e tecnologia adequada. Entedeu-se? O subsolo é rico, os armazéns são no estilo automatic refill mas, POR OUTRO LADO, faltam matérias-primas e tecnologia. Isso no púlpito da ONU, pasmem. E sendo aplaudido. E PARA ENTRAR NA HISTÓRIA COMO UMA CARA LEGAL E IMPORTANTE, VEJAM. Até eu. Quer dizer, eu não conseguiria ser mais animal porco assassino cara-de-pau que ele. Acho. Espero.

Daí ele manda o clichÊzão que ecoa até hoje: É TUDO CULPA DO MALDITO BLOQUEIO IMPERIALISTA. Aí já viu, né? Cuba vai bem, muito bem, é autossuficiente até demais, MAS o que estraga tudo é o BLOQUEIO IMPERIALISTA. Che pretendia lutar contra o malvado capitalismo mas, pô, num precisava ficar sem vender pra gente ou comprar nossas coisas, meu... num brinco mais. Resultado: apesar do brilhantismo de Guevara, Cuba ficou décadas e décadas sobrevivendo de esmola da URSS. Bem, poderiam ter ocorrido acontecimentos "de outro tipo" [hecatombe nuclear?], mas, graças aos céus, nada houve.

Resumo: é tudo culpa dos EUA ,do proletariado cubano que não soube interagir com a superior sapiência dos técnicos e responsáveis administrativos pela engenharia social del füher caribenho, jamais do Mártir da Humanidade CHE ou dos militares Castristas. Vai, me engana que eu gosto. . 

trecho de carta de J B Say para Malthus

"Since the time of Adam Smith, political economists have agreed that we do not in reality buy the objects we consume, with the money or circulating coin which we pay for them. We must in the first place have bought this money itself by the sale of productions of our own. To the proprietor of the mines whence this money is obtained, it is a production with which he purchases such commodities as he may have occasion for: to all those into whose hands this money afterwards passes, it is only the price of the productions which they have themselves created by means of their lands, capital, or industry. In selling these, they exchange first their productions for money; and they afterwards exchange this money for objects of consumption. It is then in strict reality with their productions that they make their purchases; it is impossible for them to buy any articles whatever to a greater amount than that which they have produced either by themselves, or by means of their capitals and lands."

Ou será que basta somente imprimir o reais e quem trabalhou por seu dólar, digamos, trocará de boa vontade e parelhamente um pelo outro?

Freedom and the Law, de Bruno Leoni

"Freedom" is a word used by people in their ordinary language to mean special kinds of psychological experiences. These experiences are different at different times and in different places and are also connected with abstract concepts and technical words, but they cannot merely be identified with abstract concepts or reduced to a mere word. Finally, it is possible, and probably also useful or even necessary, to formulate a stipulative definition of "freedom," but stipulations cannot avoid lexicographic research because only the latter can reveal the meanings people actually attach to the word in ordinary  usage."Freedom," by the way, is a word ,vith favorable connotations. Perhaps it may be useful to add that the word "freedom" sounds good because people use it to point to their positive attitude toward what they call "being free." As Maurice Cranston has observed in his essay on Freedom [...] people never use expressions such as "I am free" to mean that they are without something they consider to be good for them. Noone says, at least in speaking of day-to-day affairs, "I am free from money" or "I am free from good health." Other words are used to express the attitude of people toward the absence of good things: they say that they lack something; and this applies, so far as I know, to all the European languages at present as well as in the past. In other words, to be "free" from something means "to be without something that is not good for us," while, on the other hand, to lack something means to be without something that is good.

Of course, freedom has little meaning when it is complemented only by the expression "from something," and we expect people to tell us also what it is that they are free to do. But the presence of a negative implication in the word "freedom" and in certain related words like "free" seems unquestionable. This negative implication is also present in derivative words connected with the term "liberty," which is simply the Latin counterpart of "freedom" and not a word with a different meaning. For instance, "liberal" is a word that designates both in Europe and in America a negative attitude toward "constraint," regardless of the nature of the "constraint" itself, which in its turn is conceived of very differently by American and by European "liberals."

Thus, "freedom" and "constraint" in ordinary language are antithetical terms. Of course, one can like "constraint" or some kind of "constraint," like the Russian army officers of whom Tolstoy said that they liked military life because it turned out to be a sort of "commanded idleness." Many more people in the "vorld like "constraint" than we probably imagine. Aristotle made a penetrating remark when he said at the beginning of his treatise on politics that people are divided into two broad categories, those who were born to rule and those who were born to obey rulers. But even if one likes "constraint," it would be an abuse of words to say that "constraint" is freedom. Nevertheless, the idea that "constraint" is something very closely connected with freedom is at least as old as the history of political theories in the Western world.

I think that the main reason for this is that no one can be said to be "free from" other people if the latter are "free" to constrain him in some way. In other words, everyone is "free" if he can constrain in some way other people to refrain from constraining him in some respect. In this sense, "freedom" and "constraint" are inevitably linked, and this is probably too often forgotten when people speak of "freedom." But "freedom" itself in ordinary language is never constraint, and the constraint that is linked inevitably with freedom is only a negative constraint; that is, a constraint imposed solely in order to make other people renounce constraining in their turn. All this is not merely a play on words. It is a very abridged description of the meaning of words in the ordinary language of political societies whenever individuals have any power whatever to be respected or, as one might say, whenever they have any power of a negative kind entitling them to be called "free." 

In this sense, we can say that the "free market" also inevitably implies the idea of a "constraint" in that all the members of a market society have the po,ver to exercise restraint against people like robbers or thieves. There is no such thing as a "free market" with some constraining power superadded. A free market is rooted in a situation in which those engaged in market transactions have some power to constrain the enemies of a free market. This point probably is not emphasized sufficiently by those authors who, in focusing their attention on the "free market," end by treating it as the very antithesis of governmental constraint.

Thus, for instance, Professor Mises, an author whom I admire greatly for his adamant defense of the "free market" on the basis of lucid and compelling reasoning and a superb mastery of all the issues involved, says that "liberty and freedom are terms employed for the description of the social conditions of the individual members of a market society in which the power of the indispensable hegemonic bond, the state, is curbed lest the operation of the market be endangered." We notice here that he has qualified as "indispensable" the hegemonic bond of the state, but he means by liberty, as he also says, "restraint imposed upon the exercise of the police power" without adding exactly, as I would consider it reasonable to add from the point of view of a free-trader, that liberty means also restraint imposed on the exercise of the power of anyone else to interfere with the free market. As soon as we admit this meaning of liberty, the hegemonic bond of the state is not only something to be curbed, but also, and I would say first of all, something we make use of to curb other people's actions.

Economists do not deny, but also do not take into direct consideration, the fact that every economic act, as a rule, is also a legal act the consequences of which may be enforced by the authorities if, for instance, the parties to the transaction do not behave as they are expected to behave on the basis of their agreement. As Professor Lionel Robbins pointed out in his "The Nature and Significance of Economics", studies of the connection between economics and the law are still rather unusual on the part of the economists, and the connection itself, although indisputable, is rather neglected. Many economists have debated about the distinction between productive and nonproductive work, but few have examined what Professor Lindley Frazer, in "Economic Thought and Language" calls "misproductive" work-i.e., work that is useful for the worker, but not for those for whom, or against ,v"hom, he works. "Misproductive" work, such as that of beggars, blackmailers, robbers, and thieves, remains outside the scope of economics, probably because the economists take it for granted that "misproductive" work is usually against the law. In this way economists recognize that the utilities that they usually take into consideration are only those compatible with the existing law of most countries,. 

Thus, the connection between economics and the law is implied, but it is rarely regarded by economists as a special object worthy of their research. They consider, for instance, the exchange of goods, but not the behavioral exchange that makes possible an exchange of goods, regulated and occasionally enforced for that purpose by the law of all countries. Hence, a free market seems something more "natural" than

government or at least independent of government, if not, indeed, something that it is necessary to maintain "against" the government. In fact, a market is no more "natural" than government itself, and both are no more natural than, say, bridges. People who ignore this fact ought to take seriously a couplet once sung in a cabaret in Montmartre:

Voyez comme la nature a en un bon sens bien profond

A faire passer les fleuves justement sous les ponts.

(See how Nature had the extreme good sense

To make the rivers flow exactly under the bridges.)

To be sure, economic theory has not ignored the fact that it is the government that gives people the practical power to avoid constraint on the part of other people on the market. Robbins aptly emphasized this in his essay, "The Theory of Economic Policy in English Political Economy" (London, 1952), noting that "we would get an entirely distorted view" of the significance of the doctrine of what Marshall called the system of economic freedom "unless we see it in combination with the theory of law and the functions of government which its authors (from Smith onwards) also propounded." As Robbins says, "the idea of freedom in vacuo was entirely alien to their conceptions." But Professor Robbins also pointed out, in Economic Planning and International Order (London, 1937), that the classical economists paid too little attention to the fact that international trade could not emerge as a simple consequence of the theorem of comparative costs, but required some kind of international legal organization to ward off the enemies of international free trade, who, to a certain extent, are comparable to such enemies of the free market within a nation as robbers or thieves."

[páginas 49, 50 e 51]

Ficha Limpa? Conselho Nacional de Justiça? Fico com Daniel, 13

Daniel, 13

1.	Havia um homem, de nome Joaquim, que estava residindo na Babilônia.
2.	Era casado com uma mulher de nome Susana, filha de Helcias, mulher bonita e muito religiosa.
3.	Seus pais, gente correta como eram, tinham educado a filha na Lei de Moisés.
4.	Joaquim era um homem muito rico e tinha um espaçoso bosque junto à sua casa. Os judeus costumavam reunir-se ali, porque Joaquim era o mais respeitado de todos eles.
5.	Para aquele ano tinham sido nomeados como dirigentes, dois anciãos do povo, dos quais o Senhor disse: “A injustiça brotou na Babilônia, vinda dos anciãos que pareciam governar o povo”.
6.	Essesdois freqüentavam a casa de Joaquim, pois era ali que as pessoas iam procurá-los quando tinham alguma coisa a resolver.
7.	Acontecia que, quando o povo ia-se embora, por volta do meio dia, Susana saía para dar umas voltas no bosque do seu marido.
8.	Os dois anciãos todos os dias viam Susana sair para dar seu passeio e assim começaram a cobiçá-la.
9.	Perverteram o pensamento, desviaram o olhar para não enxergarem a Deus do céu, nem se lembrarem dos procedimentos corretos.
10.	Estavam os dois totalmente caídos por ela, só que um não contava ao outro a sua paixão,
11.	pois tinham vergonha de revelar seus desejos de manter relação com ela.
12.	Todos os dias ficavam esperando ansiosamente pelo momento em que ela passeava. Certo dia disseram um ao outro:
13.	“Vamos para casa que já é hora do almoço!” Saíram e um para cada lado,
14.	mas logo em seguida deram meia volta e retornaram juntos ao mesmo lugar. Foram, então, obrigados a contar um ao outro o motivo pelo qual tinham voltado e acabaram confessando sua paixão. A partir daí, combinaram procurar juntos uma boa oportunidade de pegá-la sozinha.
15.	Estavam os dois à espreita de uma ocasião oportuna, quando, um dia, ela saiu só com as duas meninas, como nos outros dias, e teve vontade de tomar banho no bosque porque estava fazendo calor.
16.	Não havia mais ninguém, a não ser os dois anciãos que estavam escondidos observando Susana.
17.	Ela disse às meninas: “Tragam-me sabão e perfumes e fechem o portão do bosque que vou tomar um banho!”
18.	Fazendo o que a patroa mandara, as meninas fecharam os portões do bosque e saíram por uma porta lateral, a fim de buscar o que lhes tinha sido mandado, sem notar os dois anciãos, que estavam bem escondidos.
19.	Bastou as meninas saírem, os dois anciãos deixaram o esconderijo e foram ao encontro de Susana.
20.	Disseram-lhe: “Olha! Os portões do bosque estão fechados e ninguém está vendo a gente. Nós estamos te desejando, concorda com a gente: Vamos manter relações!
21.	Se não concordares, nós acusaremos que um rapaz esteve aqui contigo e que foi por isso que mandaste saírem as meninas.”
22.	Susana suspirou e disse: “A situação para mim está difícil por todos os lados: Se eu fizer isso aí, estou condenada à morte, se não fizer, sei que não escapo das mãos dos senhores.
23.	Mas prefiro dizer não, e cair nas mãos dos senhores, a cometer um pecado contra o Senhor”.
24.	Em seguida ela gritou bem alto, mas os dois anciãos também gritaram contra ela.
25.	Um dos dois correu e abriu os portões do bosque.
26.	O pessoal de casa, ao ouvir os gritos no bosque, veio correndo pela porta lateral, a ver o que tinha acontecido a Susana.
27.	Os dois anciãos contaram, então, a sua estória. Os empregados ficaram muito envergonhados, porque nunca tinham ouvido falar qualquer coisa desse tipo contra Susana.
28.	No outro dia, quando o povo se reuniu na casa de seu marido Joaquim, os dois anciãos vieram com a cabeça cheia de planos malvados contra Susana, a fim de condená-la à morte.
29.	Disseram, pois, na presença do povo: “Mandai chamar Susana, filha de Helcias, esposa de Joaquim!” Mandaram chamá-la.
30.	Ela veio e com ela vieram também seus pais, seus filhos e todos seus parentes.
31.	Ela era muito delicada e de bonita aparência.
32.	Susana estava com o rosto coberto. Aqueles canalhas mandaram tirar-lhe o véu só para poderem inebriar-se com a sua beleza.
33.	Os que estavam ao lado dela e todos os que a estavam vendo puseram-se a chorar.
34.	Os dois anciãos ficaram de pé diante do povo e puseram as mãos sobre a cabeça de Susana.
35.	Chorando ela olhava para o céu, pois seu coração confiava no Senhor.
36.	Disseram, pois, os dois anciãos: “Estávamos nós dois passeando pelo bosque, quando veio Susana, acompanhada pelas duas meninas. Logo depois ela fechou os portões do bosque e mandou as meninas se retirarem.
37.	Foi quando veio ao seu encontro um rapaz, que até então estava escondido, e se deitou com ela.
38.	Nós estávamos no outro canto do bosque e, ao vermos aquela imoralidade, corremos para o lado deles.
39.	Vimos os dois agarrados um ao outro, mas não pudemos segurar o rapaz, que era mais forte do que nós. Ele conseguiu abrir o portão e fugir.
40.	A Susana, porém, nós seguramos e perguntamos quem era o tal rapaz, mas ela não o quis dizer. É o que temos a testemunhar”.
41.	A multidão acreditou neles, pois eram anciãos do povo e, ainda mais, dirigentes. E decidiram condenar Susana à morte.
42.	Em alta voz, assim exclamou Susana: “Ó Deus eterno, que conheces o que está escondido, que tudo vês antes que aconteça,
43.	tu sabes muito bem que deram um testemunho falso contra mim! Vou morrer, mas sem ter feito nada daquilo de que me acusaram.”
44.	O Senhor atendeu ao seu clamor:
45.	No momento em que era conduzida para a morte, o Senhor despertou o espírito santo de um jovem rapaz de nome Daniel.
46.	Ele gritou bem alto: “Não tenho nada a ver com a morte dessa mulher, estou inocente!”
47.	O povo inteiro voltou-se para ele dizendo: “Que foi o que você disse?”
48.	De pé no meio deles assim falou Daniel: “Como sois idiotas, israelitas! Sem julgamento e sem formar uma idéia clara acabais de condenar à morte uma mulher israelita!
49.	Voltai para o tribunal! Foi falso o testemunho desses homens contra ela!”
50.	Todo o povo voltou correndo. Os anciãos disseram a Daniel: “Vem sentar-te no nosso meio e explica para nós, pois Deus já te deu maturidade suficiente.”
51.	Daniel disse: Colocai os dois um bem distante do outro, que vou julgá-los.
52.	Depois de terem isolado um do outro, Daniel disse ao primeiro deles: “Ó homem envelhecido na malícia, agora teus pecados vão aparecer, tudo o que já vinhas praticando,
53.	ao dar sentenças injustas, condenando o inocente e deixando sair livre o culpado, quando a palavra do Senhor é: ‘Cuidado para não condenar à morte o inocente e o justo! ’
54.	Agora, pois, se viste mesmo, dize debaixo de que árvore viste os dois se entretendo?” Ele respondeu: “Debaixo de uma aroeira.”
55.	Daniel disse: “Pois mentiste exatamente contra a tua própria cabeça. O anjo de Deus já recebeu a ordem de serrar-te ao meio”.
56.	Depois de mandar embora este, Daniel fez vir o outro. Disse-lhe: “Geração de Canaã, não de Judá! A beleza feminina te desnorteou, a paixão te fez perder a cabeça.
57.	Era assim que fazíeis com as mulheres de Israel e elas, como medo, se entregavam aos vossos desejos, mas esta filha de Judá resistiu às vossas indecências!
58.	Dize-me, então, debaixo de que árvore apanhaste os dois se entretendo?” Ele respondeu: “Debaixo de um carvalho”.
59.	Daniel disse: “Pois acabas de mentir exatamente contra tua cabeça. Com a espada na mão, o anjo de Deus está esperando para cortar-te ao meio e acabar com os dois”.
60.	Toda a multidão começou a aclamar e dar louvores a Deus que salva os que nele confiam.
61.	Em seguida todos se levantaram contra os dois anciãos, pois Daniel tinha provado por suas próprias bocas que eles estavam mentindo. Fizeram com eles o que queriam fazer com Susana,
62.	de acordo com a Lei de Moisés. Foi assim que naquele dia condenaram os dois à morte, salvando uma pessoa inocente.
63.	Por causa de sua filha Susana, Helcias e sua mulher, juntamente com Joaquim, o marido dela, e todos os parentes louvaram a Deus, já que nada de indecente se encontrou nela.
64.	Daniel, por seu turno, tornou-se grande diante do povo a partir daquele dia.

Leia mais em: http://www.bibliacatolica.com.br/02/34/13.php#ixzz1owveKPTQ

MISES DAILY, 12 de Março de 2012

Um texto de Rothbard que eu nem conhecia, nem tinha lido a respeito e que foi escrito nos anos 90! Entre tantos e tantos argumentos - mais dados históricos - achei um aqui que dá uma mãozinha para questionar os que adoram NOSSA Constituição como um ato mais que meramente político, [a] "sort of permanent one-way trap", que vêem ali algo de bom , "inovador"[que não seja desmentido cabalmente em "outra parte"; resumo:  não há muito de essencial, de justo, è tudo relativo, não há princípio que não possa ser derrogado lá na frente, por outro "igual", que, mais à frente ainda, cederá espaço a um outro. Solidez das Instituições é uma dessas]. 

Ou formalistas ao menos, que prezam alguma suposta importância para "legalizar" a "ordem [e o pogresso?] institucional"[querem uma vagyuinha no STJ, né seus putos?], ou seja, apenas sob o aspecto de chancelar, CONSTITUIR uma nação - INDEPENDENTEMENTE DO QUE ESTIVER ESCRITO?, pergunto. Eram foda mesmo os parlamentares da Constituinte? Benza-Deus! Chega de ragear contra a amada e sublime CF/88, mas vai aí um sutil argumento contra ela [mas há de se ler o texto todo, lá no link pro mises institute. Ou soa muito Hippie, exagerado, sem Deus no coração [com tantos escolásticos citados, fica difícil de crer] ser contra guerras e totalitarismos ao mesmo tempo? 

"These 13 separate republics, in order to wage their common war against the British Empire, each sent representatives to the Continental Congress, and then later formed a Confederation, again with severely limited central powers, to help fight the British. The hotly contested decision to scrap the Articles of Confederation and to craft a new Constitution demonstrates conclusively that the central government was not supposed to be perpetual, not to be the sort of permanent one-way trap that Grotius had claimed turned popular sovereignty over to the king forevermore. In fact, it would be very peculiar to hold that the American Revolutionaries had repudiated the idea that a pledge of allegiance to the king was contractual and revocable, and break their vows to the king, only to turn around a few short years later to enter a compact that turned out to be an irrevocable one-way ticket for a permanent central government power. Revocable and contractual to a king, but irrevocable to some piece of paper!"

Government Explained

The Story of Broke, uma resposta

começando pelo começo [human action]

"ECONOMICS is the youngest of all sciences. In the last two hundred years, it is true, many new sciences have emerged from the disciplines familiar to the ancient Greeks. However, what happened here was merely that parts of knowledge which had already found their place in the complex of the old system of learning now became autonomous. The field of study was more nicely subdivided and treated with new methods; hitherto unnoticed provinces were discovered in it, and people began to see things from aspects different from those of their precursors. The field itself was not expanded. But economics opened to human science a domain previously inaccessible and never thought of. The discovery of a regularity in the sequence and interdependence of market phenomena went beyond the limits of the traditional system of learning. It conveyed knowledge which could be regarded neither as logic, mathematics, psychology, physics, nor biology.

Philosophers had long since been eager to ascertair. the ends which God or Nature was trying to realize in the course of human history. They searched for the law of mankind's destiny and evolution. But even those thinkers whose inquiry was free from any theological tendency failed utterly in these endeavors because they were committed to a faulty method. They dealt with humanity as a whole or with other holistic concepts like nation, race, or church. They set up quite arbitrarily the ends to which the behavior of such wholes is bound to lead. But they could not satisfactorily answer the question regarding what factors compelled the various acting individuals to behave in such a way that the goal aimed at by the whole's inexorable evolution was attained. They had recourse to desperate shifts: miraculous interference of the Deity either by revelation or by the delegation of God-sent prophets and consecrated leaders, preestablished harmony, predestination, or the operation of a mystic and fabulous "world soul" or "national soul." Others spoke of a "cunning of nature" which implanted in man impulses driving him unwittinglv along precisely the path Nature wanted him to take. 

Other philosophers were more reaIistic. They did not try to guess the designs of Nature or God. They loolted at human things from the viewpoint of government. They were intent upon establishing rules of political action, a technique, as it were, of government and statesmanship. Speculative minds drew ambitious plans for a thorough reform and reconstruction of society. The more modest were satisfied with a collection and systematization of the data of historical experience. But all were fully convinced that there was in the course of social events no such regularity and invariance of phenomena as had already been found in the operation of human reasoning and in the sequence of natural phenomena. They did not search for the laws of social cooperation because they thought that man could organize society as he pleased. If social conditions did not fulfill the wishes of the reformers, if their utopias proved unrealizable, the fault was seen in the moral failure of man. Social problems were considered ethical problems. What was needed in order to construct the ideal society, they thought, was good princes and virtuous citizens. With righteous men any utopia might be realized. 

The discovery of the inescapable interdependence of market phenomena overthrew this opinion. Bewildered, people had to face a new view of society. They learned with stupefaction that there is another aspect from which human action might be viewed than that of good and bad, of fair and unfair, of just and unjust. In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his action if he wishes to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and subjective judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature. Human action and social cooperation seen as the object of a science of given relations, no longer as a normative discipline of things that ought to be - this was a revolution of tremendous consequences for knowledge and philosophy as well as for social action."

Direitos Positivos vs. Direitos Negativos

Guia politicamente incorreto da América Latina, Ed. LeYa, pág. 106/7

"É certo também que os conquistadores espanhóis protagonizaram episódios de crueldade máxima na América. Francisco Pizarro, semanas antes de encontrar o inca Atahualpa, queimou vivos índios que haviam atacado seus homens; decapitações aconteceram com frequência; no México, o conquistador Nuño de Gusmán era famoso por torturar caciques e atirá-los aos cães. Esses atos, no entanto, não eram em geral considerados corretos: a morte dos índios e a degradação das comunidades locais provocaram a denúncia indignada de padres e conquistadores, além de uma intensa discussão ética entre os espanhóis. A ponto de o imperador Carlos V, em 1550, interromper as ações de colonização para debater a moralidade da conquista espanhola. O debate de Valladolid, travado entre os frades Bartolomé de las Casas e Juan Sepúlveda naquele ano, marca um dos primeiros momentos da história em que um povo levantou questões humanitárias e se preocupou com o outro. Também pela primeira vez na história um império parou para refletir sobre as consequência ética de seus atos. O debate de Valladolid ratificou as "novas leis" que tinham proibido, oito anos antes, a exploração do trabalho dos índios pelo sistema de encomienda. As leis provocaram revoltas entre os conquistadores - basta lembrar que um dos irmãos de Pizarro, Gonzalo, foi executado pelo reino espanhol depois de ameaçar proclamar-se rei do Peru em protesto à proibição de explorar o trabalho dos índios por meio do sistema de encomiendas*. Como sua morte atesta, o valor da vida humana, noção que tantos ativistas usam para tentar corrigir injustiças históricas, não chegaria à América não fosse a bordo das caravelas.

Quando Hernán Cortés e seus aliados conquistaram Tenochtitlan, uma de suas primeiras ações foi mandar lavar as escadarias das pirâmides indígenas para retirar as manchas de sangue seco e envelhecido que vertia dos corpos por ali. Hoje, cinco séculos depois, ainda há crianças nas escadarias das pirâmides indígenas. Elas brincam, correm e contam alegremente quantos degraus cada monumento possui." **

*" os encomendeiros ganhavam permissão real para cobrar impostos de um grupo de índios em forma de trabalho ou produtos. Em troca, tinham de protegê-los contra inimigos e iniciá-los na língua espanhola" [nota do livro]

**antigamente as criancinhas iam para lá para ter o coração arrancado em oferecimento a _____ e o corpo jogado pirâmide abaixo no glorioso esporte de  cuculeb, literalmente "rolar escada abaixo" no mais puro MAIA  MALA. [nota do kibador. aprendi no livro heheheheheh cuculeb. belo termo, não?]

Freedom and the Law, de Bruno Leoni

[ainda na introdução, link para o livro nesta outra parte da mesma, reproduzimos aqui suas duas primeiras páginas (parte da 2ª)]

"It seems to be the destiny of individual freedom at the present time to be defended mainly by economists rather than by lawyers or political scientists. 

As far as lawyers are concerned, perhaps the reason is that they are in some way forced to speak on the basis of their professional knowledge and therefore in terms of contemporary systems of law. As Lord Bacon would have said, "They speak as if they were bound." The contemporary legal systems to 'which they are bound seem to leave an ever·shrinking area to individual freedom. 

Political scientists, on the other hand, often appear to be inclined to think of politics as a sort of technique, comparable, say, to engineering, which involves the idea that people should be dealt with by political scientists approximately in the same way as machines or factories are dealt with by engineers. The engineering idea of political science has, in fact, little, if anything, in common with the cause of individual freedom.

Of course, this is not the only way to conceive of political science as a technique. Political science can also be considered (although this happens less and less frequently today) as a means of enabling people to behave as much as possible as they like, instead of behaving in the ways deemed suitable by certain technocrats.

Knowledge of the law, in its turn, may be viewed in a perspective other than that of the lawyer who must speak as if he were bound whenever he has to defend a case in court. If he is sufficiently well versed in the law, a lawyer knows very well how the legal system of his country 'works (and also sometimes, how it does not work). Moreover, if he has some historical knowledge, he may easily compare different ways in which successive legal systems have worked within the same country. Finally, if he has some knowledge of the way in which other legal systems work or have worked in other countries, he can make many valuable comparisons that usually lie beyond the horizon of both the

economist and the political scientist. 

In fact, freedom is not only an economic or a political concept, but also, and probably above all, a legal concept, as it necessarily involves a whole complex of legal consequences."

Freedom and the Law, de Bruno Leoni

"People behave as if their need for individual initiative and individual decision were almost completely satisfied by the fact of their personal acces to the benefits of scientific and technological achievements.  Strangely enough, their corresponding needs for individual initiative and individual decision in the political and legal spheres seem to be met by ceremonial and almost magical procedures such as elections of "representatives" who are supposed to know by some mysterious inspiration what their constituents really want and to be able to decide accordingly. True, individuals still have, at least in the Western world, the possibility of deciding and acting as individuals in many respects: in trading (at least to a great extent), in speaking, in personal relations, and in many other kinds of social intercourse.  However, they seem also to have accepted in principle once and for all a system whereby a handful of people whom they rarely know personally are able to decide what everybody must do, and this within very vaguely defined limits or practically without limits at all.

That the legislators, at least in the West, still refrain from interfering in such fields of individual activity as speaking or choosing one's marriage partner or wearing a particular style of clothing or traveling usually conceals the raw fact that they actually do have the power to interfere in every one of these fields[o livro é de 1961, não estranhem]. But other countries, while already offering a completely different kind of picture, reveal at the same time how much farther the legislators can go in this respect. On the other hand, fewer and fewer people now seem to realize that just as language and fashion are the products of the convergence of spontaneous actions and decisions on the part of a vast number of individuals, so the law too can, in theory, just as well be a product of a similar convergence in other fields."

[aqui o link para o .pdf na página do Mises Institute: (página 17 do .pdf e 7 na numeração do livro); aliás, o texto continua interessantíssimo por mais umas 2 ou 3 páginas[ou mais; o livro TODO deve ser muito bom, comecei a ler agora], então sugiro que se dê uma olhada no original.]

Continuando [página 11 do livro, 21 do .pdf]: "[L]egislation has undergone a very peculiar development. It has come to resemble more and more a sort of diktat that the winning majorities in the legislative assemblies impose upon the minorities, often with the result of overturning long-established individual expectations and creating completely unprecedented ones. The succumbing minorities, in their turn, adjust themselves to their defeat only because they hope to become sooner or later a winning majority and be in the position of treating in a similar way the people belonging to the contingent majority of today. In fact, majorities may be built and pulled down within legislatures according to a regular procedure that is now being methodically analyzed by certain American scholars - a procedure that American politicians call "log-rolling" and that we should call "vote-trading." Whenever groups are insufficiently represented in the legislature to impose their own will on some other dissenting group, they resort to vote-trading with as many neutral groups as possible within the legislature in order to place their intended "victim" in a minority position. Each of the "neutral" groups bribed today is in its turn prepared to bribe other groups in order to impose its own will on other intended "victims" tomorrow. In this way, majorities change within the legislature, but there are always "victims," as there are always beneficiaries of the sacrifice of these "victims." "

Milton Friedman em Entrevista Clássica